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In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” 
In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers are free to 
join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to aspj@maxwell.af.mil or cadreaspj@aol.com. 
Managing the Human Weapon System 
A Vision for an Air Force Human-Performance Doctrine 
LT COL ANTHONY P. TVARYANAS, USAF, MC, SFS 
COL LEX BROWN, USAF, MC, SFS 
NITA L. MILLER, PHD* 
The basic planning, development, organization and training of the Air Force must be well 
rounded, covering every modern means of waging air war. . . . The Air Force doctrines likewise 
must be !exible at all times and entirely uninhibited by tradition. 
IN A RECENT paper on America’s Air Force, Gen T. Michael Moseley asserted that we are at a strategic crossroads as a consequence of global dynamics and 
shifts in the character of future warfare; he 
also noted that “today’s con!uence of global 
trends already foreshadows signi"cant chal-
lenges to our organization, systems, concepts, 
and doctrine. We are at an historic turning 
point demanding an equally comprehensive 
revolution.” Furthermore, to revolutionize the 
twenty-"rst-century Air Force, according to 
General Moseley, we must start with our Air-
men since “any organizational renaissance be-
gins with people. We must prepare our Air-
men for a future fraught with challenges, 
fostering their intellectual curiosity and ability 
to learn, anticipate and adapt.”1 
An evolving recognition of “the human as 
the most important weapon system in the 
Global War on Terrorism” is evident in the 
—Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold 
special operations forces’ declaration that 
“humans are more important than hardware” 
in asymmetric warfare.2 Consistent with this 
view, in January 2004, the deputy secretary of 
defense directed the Joint Staff to “develop 
the next generation of . . . programs designed 
to optimize human performance and maxi-
mize "ghting strength.”3 In response, US Joint 
Forces Command began a transformation of 
force health protection (FHP) by addressing 
human-performance standards, metrics, ca-
pabilities, and gaps via a new Joint Human 
Performance Enhancement Joint Capabilities 
Document.4 In 2005 the director of the Of"ce 
of Net Assessment sparked wider interest by 
publishing Human Performance Optimization and 
Military Missions, which prompted the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD)/Health Affairs to 
sponsor a conference on human-performance 
optimization in June 2006.5 The conference 
report advocated such optimization at all DOD 
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levels, but as yet, no overarching implementa-
tion strategy has appeared.6 
In the Air Force, human-performance pro-
grams are generally more product oriented 
than human-centric, and relevant strategy and 
doctrine are limited to health services.7 As 
General Moseley reminds us, “History is re-
plete with examples of militaries that failed 
due to their inability to transform organiza-
tions and culture, adopt new operational con-
cepts, or leverage breakthrough technologies.”8 
The Air Force cannot leverage breakthroughs 
in human performance unless it is organiza-
tionally and culturally ready. Similarly, the 
2008 Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) Capa-
bilities Review and Risk Assessment concluded 
that we must make the most of human capital 
in terms of recruitment, selection, training, op-
erational performance, cross training, reten-
tion, and postretirement health and well-being.9 
The assessment recommended a coordinated 
program to operationalize human performance 
for all Airmen by developing an overarching 
human-performance doctrine, organizationally 
rede"ning human performance as a line re-
sponsibility with health-services input, and de-
veloping ethical and legal frameworks for Air 
Force human performance. 
In rising to Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s 
challenge to “think out of the box” in continu-
ous pursuit of better ways to support the joint 
force, we believe it is high time to address the 
shortfall in Air Force human-performance 
doctrine.10 We propose a holistic doctrine that 
incorporates a capabilities-based, total life-cycle 
approach to managing Airmen—a performance-
based force-projection model that concentrates 
on human performance while continuing to 
provide health care and casualty prevention 
to joint force commanders. 
Transforming from Force  
Health Protection to  
Human-Performance Doctrine 
Doctrine for FHP, de"ned as “all measures 
taken by commanders, leaders, individual Ser-
vice members, and the Military Health System 
to promote, improve, or conserve the mental 
and physical well-being of Service members 
across the range of military operations,” char-
acterizes every service member as a human 
weapon system requiring total life-cycle support 
and maintenance.11 It speci"cally describes this 
support in terms of three interrelated pillars: 
“healthy and "t force,” “prevention and pro-
tection,” and “medical and rehabilitative care.”12 
With this framework in mind, FHP catalyzed 
the genesis of our model for human perfor-
mance as providing capabilities of human 
weapon systems to the joint force commander. 
We departed from the health focus of FHP 
and embraced a large scope of application by 
accepting two transformational tenets. The"rst 
involves managing Airmen consistent with other 
military weapon systems. This necessitates the 
creation of capability-based requirements with 
associated performance thresholds and objec-
tives derived directly from needs identi"ed by 
the combatant commander to drive Airman 
acquisition and sustainment programs.13 These 
programs should be managed by a program 
executive of"cer (with associated program man-
agers using integrated process and product 
development) who provides a single organiza-
tional focus for the total life-cycle manage-
ment of Airmen and remains accountable for 
life-cycle costs, schedule, and performance.14 
The second tenet requires health-service 
support to focus on human performance in addi-
tion to health care as the primary means of support-
ing the joint force commander. Although this may 
seem at odds with the historical objectives of 
health-service support, it actually expands 
upon them, once we understand that health is 
a prerequisite for performance but that the 
presence of health does not guarantee perfor-
mance.15 Given the prerequisite need for 
health, addressing performance satis"es the 
FHP pillars of “healthy and "t force” and “pre-
vention and protection” (which we can equate 
with primary and secondary preventive medi-
cine). In fact, superior performance itself is a 
means of prevention and protection. For ex-
ample, victorious forces historically suffer 
lower casualty rates than defeated forces, and 
improving situational awareness decreases the 
risk of fratricide. 
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Managing Airmen’s capabilities through 
human performance erects a new doctrinal 
edi"ce with three foundational pillars: perfor-
mance sustainment, performance optimization, 
and performance enhancement ("g. 1). Since 
no universally accepted human-performance 
de"nitions exist, the names chosen for the pil-
lars serve as placeholders for major enterprise 
areas rather than speci"c de"nitions.16 Figure 
1 also depicts the pillars resting on an organi-
zational foundation that embodies attributes of 
the university model: dissemination of knowl-
edge, research, and teaching.17 Doctrine, organi-
zations, and weapon systems are interrelated— 
history demonstrates that advances in one 
area without corresponding advances in the 
others limit the overall effectiveness of weapon 
systems.18 Thus, the university model repre-
sents the organizational change needed to 
support the human-performance doctrinal vi-
sion for the human weapon system. 
Performance Sustainment for Airmen 
Performance sustainment covers accession 
through separation/retirement with the goal 
of maintaining target performance levels through-
out a career while minimizing total life-cycle costs. It 
also embraces the FHP pillars of “healthy and 
"t force” and “prevention and protection.” 
Preventive medicine is a major contributor to 
performance sustainment because physical and 
mental health remains a necessary, but not 
suf"cient, precursor for performance. Perfor-
mance sustainment contains most health-
service support functions with the exception 
of consequence management.19 The objective 
calls for sustaining performance in the face of 
enemy actions, full-spectrum (natural and tech-
nological) environmental threats and stressors, 
and advancing age. 
If we accept the paradigm of the human 
weapon system, then the breadth of perfor-
mance sustainment "ts comfortably within the 
larger framework of the DOD acquisitions life 
cycle ("g. 2), speci"cally including the use of 
requirements derived from the Joint Capabili-
ties Integration Development System. Apply-
ing the Defense Acquisition Management 
Framework to Airman acquisitions affects the 
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• Development of a portfolio of Airman ca-
pability documents (ACD) derived from 
the Joint Capabilities Integration Develop-
ment System for groups of related Air Force 
specialty codes incorporating physical, 
physiological, psychological, and cognitive 
performance thresholds and objectives.21 
• Formulation of a supporting test and 
evaluation master plan (TEMP) for each 
ACD, which becomes the source docu-
ment for conducting preaccession screen-
ing, gauging developmental progression 
during training, and monitoring perfor-
mance over a career.22 
• Consideration of the time from accession 
to end-of-life instead of a nominal 20-
year career during ACD development and 
preaccession screening, with the aim of 
minimizing total life-cycle costs. 
• Alteration of the AFMS’s preventive 
health assessments to performance and 
health assessments, primarily focusing 
on physical, physiological, psychological, 
and cognitive performance (based on 
the ACD and TEMP), with continued 
emphasis on health maintenance. Ex-
amples of performance monitoring in-
clude duty-speci"c "tness assessments, 
exposure-driven mental-health screen-
ing, and neurocognitive assessments. 
• Deployment of tailored, multidisciplinary 
expeditionary-performance support teams 
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containing traditional expertise in pre-
ventive medicine augmented by expertise 
in the physiological, psychological, and 
cognitive domains. 
Performance sustainment will drive research 
and development of continuous, real-time, 
and periodic performance-assessment tools to 
support both the ACD and TEMP; mitigation 
strategies of the performance-degrading effects 
of advancing age; and physical and psycho-
logical countermeasures to maintain perfor-
mance during warfare or exposure to environ-
mental threats such as climatic extremes, g-forces, 
fatigue, weapons effects, prolonged mental 
stressors, and witnessing or participating in 
violent acts. However, the systems-engineering 
process, rather thanthedevelopmentofcounter-
measures and personal protective equipment, 
offers the primary means of mitigating threats 
and stressors.23 
Performance Optimization for Airmen 
Performance optimization seeks to achieve the 
most ef"cient use of limited human resources by 
comprehensively integrating Airmen within 
the Air Force’s sociotechnical systems.24 People 
are the critical elements within systems, so 
adopting a human-centric perspective of sys-
tems increases total system performance and 
minimizes total ownership costs.25 Optimiza-
tion occurs in defense acquisitions, starting 
with the speci"cation of system requirements 
and !owing down through system design, de-
velopment, and deployment. It goes well be-
yond human-machine interface design and 
involves deliberate planning to ef"ciently leverage 
the Airman through the process of human systems 
integration (HSI), a process model for obtaining 
performance. Perhaps more importantly, that 
model de"nes the domains of performance: 
human factors engineering (HFE); personnel; 
training; manpower; environment, safety, and 
occupational health (ESOH); habitability; 
and survivability.26 We obtain better system 
performance with lower ownership cost by ac-
tively managing the interactions and trade-
offs between domains rather than simply opti-
mizing individual domains. As an illustration, 
employing intuitive automation in the design 
of a workstation to simplify a work process 
(HFE domain), thereby reducing manpower 
and training requirements (manpower and 
training domains), yields signi"cant savings 
over the life cycle of a system. In addition, the 
HSI tool enables program managers to coun-
ter shortfalls in one domain by augmenting 
another to achieve targeted system perfor-
mance. For example, a program forced to ac-
cept shortfalls in cockpit design (HFE do-
main) could respond by augmenting training 
(training domain) or selecting more capable 
or experienced aircrew members (personnel 
domain). Failure to adequately attend to HSI 
results in a degraded weapon system that can 
become prohibitively expensive to repair. 
A new, high-level conceptual model of the 
HSI process ("g. 3) better explains the essen-
tial relationships between the HSI domains 
and human performance.27 The input domains 
(manpower, personnel, training, and HFE) 
are typical items or services procured by the 
DOD, which makes their speci"cation as pro-
cess inputs more congruent with the DOD’s 
capabilities-development process. Additionally, 
focusing on the four input domains greatly 
simpli"es the challenges of forecasting the im-
pact of HSI trade-offs through modeling and 
simulation, a necessary consideration given 
DOD initiatives for simulation-based acquisi-
tions.28 In contrast, the ESOH, habitability, 
and survivability domains represent desired 
system attributes or behaviors not directly pro-
curable; rather, they emerge through various 
combinations of the input domains. These 
three domains also collectively describe the 
FHP pillar of “prevention and protection,” di-
rectly linking performance optimization to 
FHP and providing an avenue to address FHP 
through a systems-engineering approach. 
Performance optimization affects perfor-
mance sustainment, during which the bulk of 
prevention activities occur. The HFE domain 
drives the human physical, physiological, and 
cognitive performance requirements that, in 
turn, must be sustained throughout the life of 
a system. System requirements speci"ed for 
the ESOH, habitability, and survivability do-
mains in!uence the likelihood of future haz-
ardous exposures that will require prevention 
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and protection. Failure to compensate for hu-
man weaknesses or to capitalize on human 
strengths when specifying system require-
ments drives research and development of 
countermeasures to prevent injury or illness. 
Therefore, performance optimization maxi-
mizes ef"ciencies and cost savings through 
primary and secondary prevention. 
Performance Enhancement for Airmen 
Performance enhancement occurs chiefly 
through science and technology initiatives that 
enable Airmen to operate beyond established and 
sustainable performance thresholds, a spectrum 
ranging from intrahuman (biotechnology and 
pharmacology) to extrahuman (hardware and 
software). We developmentally plan a human-
performance science and technology road map 
“by investigating future threats; recognizing 
capability gaps and requirements; capturing 
needed system-performance characteristics; 
and understanding technology gaps, risks, and 
needs.”29 Advances in performance enhance-
ment create new capabilities for Airmen, en-
abling performance sustainment and optimi-
zation by expanding the existing performance 
envelope and providing solution sets for trade-
offs in the HSI domain. Thus, the three foun-
dational pillars of program management for 
Airmen in "gure 1 become a set of interrelated 
enterprises rather than distinct and indepen-
dent efforts. Integration becomes the key word 
when we organizationally, functionally, and "-
nancially address human performance. 
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Summary 
The world’s security environment is chang-
ing dramatically in many dimensions—political, 
economic, social, and military. In response, 
“the Air Force is transforming into an effects-
based, ef"cient provider of human combat 
capability, which can sustain air, space, and cy-
berspace superiority for the joint force and 
our Nation.”30 As General Moseley pointed out, 
“It is the Airmen who transform hunks of metal, 
buckets of bolts, microprocessors, and circuitry 
into the Nation’s war"ghting edge” (emphasis 
in original).31 Providing capability for human 
combat, however, requires related doctrine on 
weapon systems. This article has proposed a 
vision for a broad human-performance doc-
trine for the Air Force—to sustain, optimize, 
and enhance Airmen. It addresses “how we 
think” about human performance and lays the 
foundation for future doctrine describing “what 
we think” about human performance. Ulti-
mately, human-performance doctrine should 
provide a capabilities-based, total life-cycle ap-
proach to managing Airmen. Within the AFMS, 
it is time to move from a health-based FHP model 
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The Air Force Commander 
The Power of Interaction and Vision 
HOW DO YOU measure command success? Simply by the next job you are awarded? Or by combat victory, plain and simple? If you care about 
these questions, this article has something for 
you. The target audience is US Air Force com-
manders, but I suspect that any leader can im-
prove by paying careful attention to the sub-
jects of interaction and vision. 
Many individuals measure command suc-
cess by a combination of mission and people. 
The question is, “How do you successfully ful-
!ll the mission and maximize your people’s 
potential?” Answer that, and you probably 
have the essence of command! Command is 
“the legal authority to direct and order subor-
dinates to perform duties or accomplish ac-
tions to attain military objectives.”1 One way of 
measuring commanders’ success involves con-
sidering their command climate—the envi-
ronment in which they exercise their author-
ity and guide their people to carry out the 
mission. This article addresses the tools, means, 
and feel that a commander uses to create a 
successful environment. 
I have experience as commander of an F-22 
operations group. Before you decide, “Well, 
I’m not one of those!” let me simply say that it 
puts me in a unique position of having both 
subordinate commanders and an immediate 
superior in close proximity to my command. 
This position as a middleman allows some in-
sight into command because I not only give 
COL WILLIAM MOTT, USAF* 
direction and observe the !rsthand effects, but 
also react to the directions of my commander. 
Command Climate 
Command is about impact! Coach Tom 
Landry of the Dallas Cowboys once said, 
“Leadership is getting someone to do what 
they don’t want to do, to achieve what they 
want to achieve.” Combat commanders have 
been inspiring followers ever since Alexander 
the Great led the charge that routed the Per-
sians at the river Gaugamela. It is what today’s 
commanders need to do. The question is, 
“How can Air Force commanders make a dif-
ference from the moment they enter their 
units until they head home?” Everything that 
occurs affects the command climate, which, 
though perhaps more of a joint term than an 
Air Force one, means “a state or condition ex-
isting from shared feelings and perceptions 
among soldiers about their unit, about their 
leaders, and about their unit’s programs and 
policies. This condition is created by the com-
mander and his chain of command from the 
commander’s vision and leadership style, and 
in"uenced and perpetuated by their commu-
nication and their leadership.”2 
A positive command climate blends the im-
portance of people and mission into an orga-
nizational climate that breeds success. Com-
manders can be either the moat that prevents 
*Commander of the 325th Operations Group, Tyndall AFB, Florida, the author has commanded at the group and squadron levels. An 
F-22 instructor pilot, he has over 3,000 hours in the F-15C, with assignments to Bitburg AB, Germany; Langley AFB, Virginia; Nellis AFB, 
Nevada; Eglin AFB, Florida; and Tyndall AFB. He has served at Headquarters Air Education and Training Command and Headquarters 
North American Aerospace Defense Command. Colonel Mott is a combat veteran of Operations Desert Storm and Southern Watch. 
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their units from attaining the goal or the 
bridge that enables them to reach it. Whether 
they excel or just plod along, the command-
er’s leadership will make a difference, either 
for good or bad. 
How do you shape a favorable command 
climate? How do you create a unit that Airmen 
fondly recall, saying, “That was a great squad-
ron,” or “That was a golden time at Base X,” or 
“The ORI [operational readiness inspection] 
rated us outstanding because. . . .”? You do it 
through interaction with subordinates and su-
periors and through a well-communicated com-
mand vision. Finally, preparation for an ORI 
will test these command skills. 
Command Interaction 
Commanders shape their units. Their mere 
presence affects mission accomplishment and 
Airmen’s perceptions of the unit. The means 
and tools that the commander uses to interact 
with his or her command are critical. 
Unfortunately, human interactions can’t be 
boiled down to cookbook solutions or check-
lists of things to do or say. The nature of com-
mand interaction is dynamic, and what applies 
in one situation may not apply in another. For 
example, one of my subordinates asked me 
for an appointment. I determined that the 
meeting would certainly be a “routine” discus-
sion about assignments since the of!cer was 
scheduled for reassignment, so the best means 
to get ready called for reviewing his personnel 
records. When the of!cer sat down, I started 
talking about potential training and assign-
ments. Suddenly, I learned that the real rea-
son for the meeting was the of!cer’s personal 
situation and how the assignment might affect 
his family—not exactly what the “checklist” 
said about a counseling session. 
That is the point about using a checklist or 
an academic approach to interactions within 
the command. Personnel issues are not easily 
divisible into subject areas or readily handled 
with a checklist. There is no checklist for each 
meeting because you never know where that 
encounter is going. Yet, even though you can’t 
have a checklist for every type of meeting, 
some key guidelines do exist for the different 
types that a commander might face. 
Rule one: every interaction with people has 
an effect on the command climate. Whether it 
is with your superior, subordinates, or family 
and friends, it all makes a difference. After 
even a small interaction, someone walks away 
with an opinion of you and your command. 
Consider the commander’s personal staff. 
How the commander walks into the of!ce and 
starts the day is key. Like it or not, the com-
mander’s demeanor will answer questions 
they all have, such as “Will it be a good day or 
a bad day?” and “What kind of mood is the 
boss in?” The way the commander starts the 
day with his immediate staff will shape how 
they deal with the rest of the command. You 
can’t afford to have a quiet morning or bad 
day—you simply must start with enthusiasm, 
courtesy, and excitement. 
How often does the average Airman inter-
act with his or her commander? I would say 
that time with the commander is less available 
than most of us would like to admit. In fact, 
some of your subordinates’ only contact with 
the commander will occur through the staff. 
How many phone calls do the executive of!cer 
and secretary !eld each day that never reach 
the commander’s of!ce? A great many. The 
staff represents you and may “impact” more of 
the command than the commander. How the 
commander interacts with his staff has a cas-
cading effect throughout the entire command. 
What about your interactions with subordi-
nate commanders and leaders? Just as your 
staff deals with your Airmen, so do your subor-
dinate commanders touch everyone under their 
command. Commanders interact with subor-
dinate commanders via writing or by commu-
nicating one on one or in a group. Within 
these engagements a commander makes his 
or her in"uence felt within the unit. 
Letters—now e-mail—offer an easy way to 
communicate. You state your case, hit “send,” 
and move on to something else. There is no 
need to converse, explain, debate, or align 
your schedules. Personal digital assistants (PDA) 
and e-mail make access nearly instantaneous. 
Written communication to subordinates has a 
great number of advantages, and, clearly, a 
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modern commander must use e-mail to exer-
cise command. Those who say that “e-mail 
leadership is no leadership” must come from 
a different generation! Nevertheless, you must 
be careful when using written communica-
tion, especially instant communication. How 
many e-mail addicts do you know—people 
with cell phones attached to their belts and set 
to vibrate for every message received? The ad-
dictive and impersonal nature of e-mail war-
rants special care when used by a leader. 
Immediate written communication carries 
hidden dangers. Certainly, the risk of being 
misunderstood is high unless you are a careful 
writer. Do you have a humorous personality? 
Someone may simply interpret your e-mail 
humor as sarcasm or worse. What about that 
instant access to your subordinates or com-
manders? What message do you convey when 
the date and time tag on your e-mail says Sat-
urday at 0200? Do you expect an immediate 
response? Does it send an implied message 
about your priorities at home? Maybe not, but 
your recipient can infer something about your 
leadership—perhaps a message that you do 
not want to convey. 
Pres. Abraham Lincoln supposedly wrote 
letters to his generals that he never sent. He 
obviously put some thought into his directions 
yet found it better not to send them. Perhaps 
a similar lesson applies to e-mail communica-
tions: some thought needs to go into the craft-
ing of messages, and perhaps more than a few 
should not go forward! 
Commanders can also communicate with 
subordinate commanders one on one, a style 
that offers the best chance for interaction. I 
consider the time I get with the wing com-
mander precious. Any small conversation with 
him answers questions that save me from send-
ing e-mails, and I hear what is important to 
him. Face-to-face time with the boss is invalu-
able. And so it is with your subordinate com-
manders. That communication must occur 
frequently, outside your of!ce. You must move 
around so that your Airmen can see you talk-
ing to subordinate commanders and supervi-
sors in their work areas. Not only do they get 
to see you outside the ivory tower, but also you 
get to see the “ground truth” of the facilities 
and people under your command. 
What should you say during one-on-one 
conversations with subordinate leaders? Again, 
there is no checklist to use. Commanders have 
an agenda, and subordinates have theirs. I sug-
gest that the more the subordinate talks, the 
more the commander can support him or her. 
Think of it as bump steering, a term that de-
scribes how a pilot can adjust an aircraft’s auto-
pilot while keeping it engaged: small control-
stick inputs that “bump” the aircraft to the 
correct heading and altitude. Similarly, subor-
dinate commanders need to remain engaged 
and receive only small guidance from the senior. 
You should spend less time talking and more 
time listening when interfacing one on one. 
The more common method of communi-
cating with subordinate commanders occurs 
via meetings. Most units have a leaders’ meet-
ing at least once a week, but is it a pleasure or 
a pain? Is it productive or sti"ing? As expected, 
the way the commander conducts the meeting 
determines the environment that, in turn, will 
affect the unit. Does communication take place 
in one direction? Does the commander allow 
dissension? Does the conversation delve too 
closely into the subordinate commander’s 
area of responsibility? The commander must 
ensure that the meeting is productive, enjoy-
able, and marked by open communication 
and clear decisions. Ultimately, are the com-
mander’s meetings “councils of war” in which 
democracy reigns or a means of gathering 
data, listening to opinions, and making deci-
sions? I prefer the latter style. 
Here are two insights that speak to the 
power of meetings. In one case, I was chairing 
a meeting with subordinate commanders. Jok-
ingly, one of them said, “Sir, I’ve been elected 
to talk to you on a certain issue.” It seemed 
humorous, but it raised the question of whether 
I was approachable or too autocratic. If subor-
dinate leaders are not comfortable voicing dis-
sent, then they are not likely to talk openly 
about dif!cult issues. And that can mean that 
their vision may not cover the commander’s 
blind spot. 
In a second case, while attending a meeting 
chaired by the wing commander, I noted that 
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when someone brought up bad news, mem-
bers of the audience kept their eyes not on the 
briefer but on the commander. They wanted 
to read his body language—to see how he 
would react. In the same manner, the “eyes 
and ears of the wing” were looking at the sub-
ordinate commanders at the table to see how 
they would react—to see if they would get 
along, !x blame, or say nothing. The conduct 
of the leaders at any meeting, even their inter-
actions, in"uences command climate. 
As in one-on-one discussions, large meet-
ings provide a means by which the commander 
in"uences his or her unit, for good or bad. In 
the Air Force, we traditionally call the room to 
attention out of respect for the commander. 
Just as that focuses everyone on the command-
er’s presence, so should the commander focus 
on his or her conduct during the meeting. 
Commanders have the power to concentrate 
on the mission’s and their people’s success, 
and to build a positive command climate. 
Command interaction is a powerful part of 
commanding the staff and subordinate com-
manders, but especially members of the unit. 
How should the commander interact with Air-
men? The commander is the identity of the 
unit and the representative of the Air Force 
enterprise to those Airmen. If you can’t be ap-
proachable, if you can’t share some informa-
tion, how are your Airmen supposed to know 
what is important to you? Most of us have seen 
pictures of Gen Dwight Eisenhower meeting 
with members of the 101st Airborne Division 
prior to D-day. Some might think it was a me-
dia stunt, but in reality it was good for the men 
and good for Eisenhower. According to one 
account, 
Corporal Kermit Latta was struck by the “terri!c 
burden of decision and responsibility” which 
showed on his face and by the sincerity of his 
effort to communicate with his young soldiers. 
He paused to speak to their group, and we can 
detect in his exchanges something of the deft 
personal appeal which was to make him the 
United States’ most popular postwar president: 
“What is your job, soldier?” 
“Ammunition bearer, sir.” 
“Where is your home?” 
“Pennsylvania, sir.” 
“Did you get those shoulders working in a coal 
mine?” 
“Yes sir.” 
“Good luck to you tonight, soldier.” 
This exchange demonstrates that Eisenhower 
not only spoke to soldiers, he saw them as well. 
That was and is rare for generals.3 
On that night of 5 June 1944, General 
Eisenhower watched the members of the en-
tire 101st Airborne Division board their C-47s, 
waited while they launched, and saluted each 
plane as it took off.4 I think there was some-
thing real in the general’s command interac-
tion—an attitude that connected the com-
mander with his men. This is an essential 
aspect of command interaction. 
I look for that interaction all the time. 
When I step out to "y, the crew chiefs and 
"ight-line supervisors know that the com-
mander is coming out. Those !ve minutes be-
fore I need to climb in and go "y are critical. 
The same is true when I’m in the staff car driv-
ing or walking the "ight line during a launch. 
As a commander, you see the other command-
ers often, whether in daily meetings or be-
cause “you’re the boss.” But the people that 
you meet for !ve minutes on the "ight line 
don’t see the commanders as often. Those few 
minutes of interaction represent their com-
plete picture of them. You can’t afford that 
time to be negative in any way. Like General 
Eisenhower, you must “see” your Airmen. 
Here is an example that humbled me and 
emphasized the power of words from a leader. 
I was having breakfast with the wing’s chiefs 
and with those of Air Education and Training 
Command and went through the dining-hall 
line !rst. I was polite, engaging, and pleasant 
to the Senior Airman who was cooking. Or so 
I thought. As I waited, the two chiefs ordered 
their food and chatted with the Senior Air-
man and other servers. In the time it takes to 
cook an omelet, the chiefs learned where the 
Senior Airman was from, how he joined the 
Air Force, that he was a football player, that he 
was !nishing his college degree, and that he 
liked his job at Tyndall AFB, Florida. The two 
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chiefs joked with one another and compli-
mented the young Airman on his service to 
the country. All I got was an omelet, but I was 
pleasant! The Airman got a memorable con-
versation with two command chiefs. Who did 
the better job as a leader? 
In summary, a commander’s interaction 
with subordinate leaders and Airmen will cre-
ate an environment depending solely on his 
or her style. But without a purpose, message, 
and vision, it can amount to nothing more 
than pleasantries. It is essential that a com-
mander communicate a vision—the purpose 
behind all this interaction. A commander’s in-
teraction becomes more than words, e-mails, 
or meetings when he or she communicates 
the core of the mission—the vision. 
Command Vision 
A commander’s interaction style must be 
precise and purposeful. You can’t have one 
without the other. Vision is a powerful thing, 
but without the tools to communicate, it is 
wasted. That is why I spoke of command inter-
action before vision. 
Vision is a tough concept to master. Is it just 
words or a true means by which the com-
mander communicates his or her intent? 
Think of “Integrity, Service, Excellence.” Is it a 
slogan or powerful set of words? Is it a saying 
on the bottom of PowerPoint slides, or is it 
truly our core values? I think it is what we are 
because I can weave those words into any mis-
sion, action, or event with which I am associ-
ated. Gen Douglas MacArthur said, “ ‘Duty,’ 
‘Honor,’ ‘Country’—those three hallowed words 
reverently dictate what you want to be, what 
you can be, what you will be.”5 This is true for 
the US Military Academy’s “Duty, Honor, 
Country,” and it is the same with the Air 
Force’s “Integrity First, Service before Self, Ex-
cellence in All We Do.” But it is that way only 
because leaders make it part of their everyday 
actions. Vision—speci!cally, the Air Force’s 
core values—frames our daily operations. 
Vision is an equally tough concept to imple-
ment. It is the inspiration for future operations, 
while the activity of daily operations can either 
detract from achieving the vision or help it 
along. The point is that just as a commander’s 
interactions affect Airmen’s ability to accom-
plish the unit’s mission, so can daily routine 
hinder attainment of the commander’s vision. 
How do you shape a vision, craft it, and 
make it valuable to the unit? Command vision 
can be de!ned as that which “empowers, in-
spires, and challenges. . . . Vision is the rudder 
that keeps a ship on course.”6 It is that concept 
to which all unit efforts return. When crafting 
a vision, you should begin by referencing mis-
sion and vision statements for echelons of 
command above the unit (Air Force, major 
command, numbered air force, wing, and even 
combatant command, if applicable). Next, you 
should write a vision statement for the unit, fo-
cusing it on the future, grounding it on current 
operations, and dividing it into components. 
We can explain the crafting of a vision state-
ment simply by analyzing one. Consider the 
vision that I espouse for my F-22/F-15/Air 
Battle Manager operations group: “Shape the 
CAF [Combat Air Forces] with Air Dominance 
War Fighters of Character.” I think it works as 
a vision statement because I can break it into 
components that re"ect the values of my 
group. The main component ideas are 
“shape,” “war !ghters,” and “character.” The 
325th Operations Group is a training com-
mand. Our focus is air dominance. And war 
!ghters are needed in the global war on terror. 
Every student will someday be in a position to 
in"uence the CAF. Before long, our graduates 
will become instructors at Tyndall; most instruc-
tors are in only their third or fourth year of "y-
ing in their weapon system. Finally, the students 
who depart Tyndall are leaving Air Education 
and Training Command and going to the CAF 
after nearly two years of "ying training that 
started at a commissioning source focused on 
character development. Isn’t it appropriate 
that their last training unit again emphasize 
character? I’ve had the privilege of "ying with 
many pilots, and I remain convinced that the 
great ones were people of character. 
A vision statement that can be broken into 
components directly relating to the mission is 
useful and helps move the unit ahead. How-
ever, a vision can simply become a set of words. 
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I was in a unit that had very impressive slides 
for various meetings, but I began to notice 
that the last slide always included a powerful 
quotation, something that could easily be a 
mission or vision statement—yet it wasn’t the 
current wing mission. It wasn’t even the major 
command’s mission. Then it changed! De-
pending on the briefer, the ending slide had a 
different slogan. It took me a while to track 
down those words and discover that they were 
old but that they had lingered on the Power-
Point master slide! Unfortunately, they had 
become just words. 
If a well-crafted commander’s vision can be 
powerful, how does he or she capture that 
power and make it work for the unit? How 
does the commander take the time available 
each day and shape it so that the unit’s efforts 
reach towards the vision—the goal? Two 
means for a commander to do that include 
keeping a combat focus and planning for each 
day in command. 
I have "own in combat, and, clearly, the 
best way commanders can push their vision is 
to have a combat focus. That is all there is to 
it. We have one mission to execute, one activ-
ity for which everyone in the unit is responsi-
ble. When all else fails, combat employment, 
execution, and mission are number one! That 
is the emphasis. We are warriors, and a com-
bat focus is the !rst step towards achieving a 
commander’s vision. Think of professional 
football, whose teams concentrate on winning 
the Super Bowl. Nothing else matters. The 
same is true in the Air Force—winning in 
combat is all that matters. 
To be focused, a commander requires a 
daily plan of attack. Commanders will likely 
be bombarded with 50 e-mails a day that can 
shackle them to their computers, just as the 
paperwork in-box can occupy them for hours. 
Paying excessive attention to immediate needs 
can detract from commanders’ long-term goals. 
Here are some ideas to help control the 
needs of today and meet the goals of tomor-
row. First, have a calendar—marked not only 
with other people’s meetings that you have to 
attend but also with things that you want to 
do. If you want time to walk the "ight line, 
then schedule it. If you want time to work out, 
then schedule it. If you want time to talk with 
another commander, then schedule it. With 
my own calendar, after I subtract time for "y-
ing and meetings, I have roughly two days 
each week to meet my priorities. Command-
ers shouldn’t leave time open on the calendar 
and wait to see what comes up. They should 
have a plan for their time that will support 
their goals, address their concerns, and sup-
port the unit’s vision. 
Second, control your in-box—both for paper-
work and e-mail. I worked for a man who kept 
his in-box in a desk drawer. I supposed he did 
so purely for aesthetics—for keeping the com-
mander’s desk looking neat. But I noticed that 
he would look at the in-box only when he 
wanted to, checking it in the morning and 
evening. He would go through it when he had 
the time, and by limiting his constant atten-
tion to it, he always had a small stack of paper-
work to plow through. He maximized his time 
by limiting his “nibbling” at the in-box. This 
wasn’t an accident; it was planned. 
The same is true of e-mail messages: you 
could spend all day answering them. Although 
you would never miss anything, consider the 
effort necessary to answer e-mail as it arrives. 
You’ve seen the guy with the belt-mounted 
PDA set to buzz for each new e-mail. He grabs 
it, enters his password, selects “messaging,” se-
lects “e-mail,” and then waits for the program 
to open. If he doesn’t reply, he takes time to 
close the program and return the PDA to his 
belt. Think of the time it takes to answer each 
e-mail—how it adds up over a day, a week, a 
year. Haven’t we learned something from the 
industrial revolution of American history? 
Wouldn’t it be better to set aside time for 
e-mail, much as you do for an in-box, and plow 
through it all at once? I think so, and I don’t 
set my PDA to ring for new e-mails—or wear it 
on my uniform! (Although I know you can, 
this is my technique!) 
So what is the point of controlling the lit-
eral and electronic in-box? To generate time 
to realize your command vision, not simply re-
act to daily activities. The payoff is having time 
to focus on goals and objectives rather than 
jumping for every other organization’s priori-
ties. A commander must keep perspective on 
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the needs of daily correspondence versus its 
impact on the overall game plan. 
For example, an e-mail from the unit train-
ing manager appeared one day, containing 
various details found in a status-of-training re-
port as well as comments on additional train-
ing that the group lacked. This includes routine 
events such as !re-extinguisher training— 
mandatory items reportable to headquarters 
because they re"ect the unit’s and each indi-
vidual’s ability to deploy. This particular e-mail 
listed 238 events overdue in the operations 
group, consisting of !ve squadrons. Two hun-
dred thirty-eight events! Good grief! This re-
quired immediate commander involvement! I 
made it a priority to “solve this problem” and 
make our “stats” improve. Unfortunately, how-
ever, these events had no effect on our daily 
mission; this training did not support my vi-
sion. Their completion, whether immediately 
or later, would neither change the number of 
sorties we "ew nor improve the safe execution 
of our primary "ying mission. Worse yet, it 
turned out that the operations group and all 
of its Airmen had over 20,000 ancillary train-
ing events to ful!ll! This e-mail about the sta-
tus of ancillary training identi!ed less than 1.2 
percent of the annual training requirements 
that were delinquent! What would a reason-
able level of training amount to? Perhaps 90 
percent complete? That translates to 2,000 
events not completed—and we would still be 
at 90 percent! 
The point is that an e-mail arrives announc-
ing a problem, but without a comprehensive 
approach to determining its priority and rele-
vance to the mission, it can quickly become a 
snare for a commander’s time. Commanders 
need that time to make their vision real. How 
often has an e-mail arrived announcing a 
deadline for required information to “solve a 
problem”? I suggest that, often, the problem 
is neither a mission-threatening issue nor wor-
thy of the given deadline. True, a commander 
must react to his or her superiors, but without 
a game plan for e-mail, the “ping” can be 
translated down into the unit with the wrong 
message about priorities and focus. 
Simply stated, have a command vision, and 
make time to move it along. Keep a combat 
focus, keep moving forward, and keep manag-
ing distractions. The largest percentage of a 
commander’s time should concentrate on car-
rying out the mission and making the vision a 
reality—not managing the daily routine. An 
ORI offers one way of determining the success 
of your vision and command-interaction skills. 
Application: 
Preparation for an Operational  
Readiness Inspection 
A commander’s interaction with his or her 
command—whether individually, in meetings, 
or via electronic communication—is critical 
to success. The way that the commander ap-
plies his or her vision to the unit contributes 
to the command climate. 
How can you know that your unit is on the 
right track? We are a warrior culture and a na-
tion at war, so combat would represent the ulti-
mate test. Short of that, consider an ORI. In 
the preparation for and execution of this in-
spection, a unit commander faces a strong 
challenge of his or her command climate. 
Earlier, I talked about command interac-
tion and then about vision. I chose this order 
because without the tools for communication, 
a good vision will rot within the commander. 
But a major event like an ORI demands that 
we start with vision. We always want to begin 
with “outstanding” and work from there. We’re 
all winners; it’s why we are in the service and 
desire to !ght the good !ght. But what if you 
declare “an ‘outstanding’ or go home” and 
then garner only an “excellent”? A better 
place to start is to simply say, “We’ll do our 
best” and build a game plan that focuses on 
the ORI’s major areas. 
I was once involved in an ORI, working 
closely with the chief of Standardization and 
Evaluation (Stan/Eval), who told me point-
blank that the best we could expect was a “sat-
isfactory” since there were just too many issues 
to correct in the time remaining. It was a truth-
ful and accurate assessment. To our credit, 
though, both of us agreed to attempt to earn 
the best possible rating. It took commitment, 
far more extra effort than expected, and close 
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interaction between us to !nd the key areas 
and determine where to place our main ef-
fort. It wasn’t fun preparing, but we achieved 
our vision—an “outstanding” rating. To this 
day, I think we succeeded because we started 
small and worked big. We literally applied the 
old adage that “the journey of 1,000 miles be-
gins with a single step.” We transferred vision 
from wishful thinking into something that 
produced practical results—and that chief of 
Stan/Eval was a true hero! 
Now I’ll bet you want more detail than 
“work from small to large” when facing an 
ORI. Your ORI is probably not the unit’s !rst. 
A review of past reports offers a good place to 
start. Beyond that, here are some focal points 
for inspection preparation: 
1. Obvious discrepancies. Do not have an 
obvious, lingering issue that would cause 
the inspector general (IG) to say, “Our 
hands are tied. Sorry!” Determine what 
must be at 100 percent. 
2. Checklists and Air Force instructions 
(AFI). Every inspector asks, “What do you 
do?” and follows with, “Show me your 
checklist and AFIs.” We all do our jobs, 
but can we show why we do them that way 
and document training and execution? 
3. Programs. Whether they are major, like 
Stan/Eval or Quality Assurance, or mi-
nor, such as recall rosters, if they are 
programs, they will be inspected. So they 
must be in good order! Consider trying 
an information-exchange program be-
tween units with similar programs. 
4. Attitude. Likely, the IG team will !nd 
faults in every area it examines. If in-
spectors !nd nothing on !rst glance, 
they will continue to dig. I suspect that 
subjective judgment plays a role in de-
termining the !nal grade. The unit with 
attitude (which includes dress, appear-
ance, customs, and courtesies) can win 
that “gray area.” 
5. Staff-assistance visits and self-inspections. 
These are powerful tools for the com-
mander because they are often con-
ducted by the same people who will re-
turn to inspect during the ORI. The key 
is to think like the inspectors and use 
the same procedures they use. The IG 
inspectors are Airmen, just like us. They 
run checklists and inspect according to 
the AFIs, so there is no magic involved! 
What they can do, you can too. 
If that answers vision, what of interactions? 
An ORI tests commanders’ interaction with 
their commands. Clearly, they have the great-
est experience with inspections and know the 
mission and operations. Quite literally, com-
manders can best endure the brunt of the in-
spection and handle all details. But, of course, 
they can’t do that. They have to get their units 
ready, get them to do the work, be ready to 
meet inspectors, and solve problems. This is 
the test of communications within a unit. 
An ORI is known as a leadership test. Al-
though it tests vision—the ability to set a goal 
and reach it—the ORI really gauges a com-
mander’s ability to interact and communicate 
with his or her Airmen. After the inspection, 
we quickly forget the grade—but not the 
months of preparation. The methods, tone, 
and environment created by the commander’s 
approach to the ORI will remain. The ORI 
tests the commander’s skill at interacting with 
Airmen in the face of a challenge. When the 
IG tells the commander, “We have a !nding 
you need to know about,” his or her interac-
tion skills are going to be stressed and tested. 
The ORI will assess commanders’ ability to 
overcome obstacles to ful!lling their vision. It 
requires honed interaction skills that are both 
logical and practical. Some say that we should 
do away with ORIs or call them something 
else, but that is nonsense! Tested units per-
form better, and tested commanders improve 
their leadership skills. 
Conclusion 
This article is one of many on command. It 
won’t be the last, and it presents no new trick 
or fad. I sought to take some of the mystery 
out of formulating a command vision and to 
emphasize that command interactions are 
02-Merge-Mott.indd   50 4/28/09   1:21:26 PM
50 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2009 
powerful tools. I hope it made you think, “I’ve 
been there” or “I’ll watch for that.” 
I concentrated on command climate—the 
subjective assessment that a unit is good or 
bad. Commanders play the greatest role in de-
termining the unit’s status by setting the vi-
sion, focusing the unit’s eyes on the goals, and 
de-emphasizing the daily routine. At the same 
time, they build a cohesive unit via personal 
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